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1.0 Definition
Corporate governance means the process and structure used to
direct and manage the business and affairs of the
Corporation with the objective of enhancing long-term value
for shareholders and financial viability of the business.
The process and structure define the division of power and
accountabili ty among shareholders, the board of directors
and management and can have an impact on other stakeholders
such as employee, customers, suppliers and communities.
2.0 Scope of Paper
This paper will endeavour to give only an overview of
certain topics of corporate law and its practice wtich
relate to corporate governance: the constitution and
structure of corporation, the duty of directors and
principal officers, shareholders I remedies, the
effectiveness of regulatory regimes, the role of the Court.
It can plainly be argued that every rule of corporate Law ,
no matter how trivial is related to corporate governance i
time does not permit the writer· to deal with all such rules
and some of the more important are left undiscussed indeed
the take-over regime, the audit and accounts function and
the disclosure requirements. This paper will also interact
with some socio-economic evaluations as to what is conducive
to proper corporate governance. It would conclude with some
recommendations.
3.0 Concern on Corporate Governance
3.1
In the wake of world-wide stock market crashes of 1987 a
number of steps were taken in many jurisdictions to improve
the system by which companies are controlled.
The Report of the Committee on Financial of Corporate
G~vernan~e, the Cadbury Report, published in the united
K~ngdom ~n 1992 and recommending the adoption of a Code of
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Best Practice (Cadbury 1992) noted that:
It is, however the continuing concern about standards
of financial re~orting and accountability, heightened by
the BCCI Maxwell and the controversy over director's
pay which has kept corporate governance in the public
eye (preface)
3.2
Had a Code such as ours been in existence
we believe that a number of the recent
unexpected company failures and cases of
have received attention earlier (para 1.9)
In Australia, the Companies and Securities Advisory
Committee recommended extensive new laws on related party
transactions "following the corporate collapses of the 1980,
it has become evident that some corporate controllers abuse
their position of trust by arranging for the shifting of
assets around and away from companies and corporate groups
and into their own hands (CA SAC 1991, p.1), The Explanatory
Memorandum to the Australian Corporate Law Report Act 1992
acknowledges that "one cannot prevent dishonesty by
legislation" nevertheless states that the new law "is
intended to protect the shareholders of public companies
against the possibility that the value of their investment
will be eroded by a related party arranging for them to
enter into a transaction which gives a benefit to the
related party" (Explanatory Memorandum, paras 210, 206).
in the past,
examples of
fraud would
3.3 On June 25, 1993 the Toronto Stock Exchange established the
Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada with a mandate
to conduct a comprehensive study of corporate governance in
Ca~ada and to make recommendations to improve the manner in
wh1ch Canadian corporations are governed. It is the
Committee's belief that there is a direct relationship
between corporate governance and investor confidence in
capital markets and any recommendations made are to be
designed to increase confidence in and improve the
efficiency of Canadian capital markets an order to
ultimately enhance the competitiveness of the Canadianeconomy.
3.4 More ambitiously, the American Law Institute (ALI) in 1978
formally instituted the Corporate Governance Project in
furtherance of the ALI's mission "to promote the
clarification and simplification of the law and its better
adaptation to social needs". On March 31, 1992 a proposed
Final Draft of the Principles of Corporate Governance:
Analysis and Recommendations was released by the ALI which
represents a most commendable Restatement of principles
acco~~dating the complexity of American Corporate case law,
prov1s~on~ and practice. This document of 822 pages setting
~he pr~nc1ples together with comments and related provisions
1S an 1rnpressiveproduct of the ALI and would be a model for
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evaluating corporate governance legislation throughout the
world .
.0 The common theme of the various committees appear to place
some confidence that new rules, code of practice etc. may
make a substantial contribution to ameliorate the deficiency
of legal structure which accelerated corporate collapse in
the past. This paper writer is not so confident. Galbraith
recently wrote that the experience of the 1980's have been
~epeated many times, including the frenzied tUlip markets of
~olland in the 17th Century, the national South Sea Bubble
l~ th early 18th century and the booms and busts cyc~es ~f
tne 1890s, 1920s, 19305 and 19605. Each of the situatlon In
the past appear to have the common elements of : people
m~smerized by the idea of easy money, an impression that
wath money comes intelligence and acumen, an upscaling of
greed and the denouement of mass disillusionment following
the crash. Despite the cyclical crashes Galbraith's warning
on over reliance on the instrumentality of law is apposite:-
" Those who are involved never wish to attribute stupidity
to themselves. Markets also are theologically
sacrosanct. Some blame can be placed on the more
spectacular or felonious of the previous speculators,
but not on the recently enchanted (and now disenchanted)
participants. The least important questions are the ones
most emphasized: What triggered the crash? Were there
some special factors that made it so dramatic or
drastic? Who should be punished?
Yet beyond a better perception of the speculative
tendency and process itself, there probably is not a
great deal that can be done. Regulation outlawing
financial incredulity or mass euphoria is not a
practical possibility. If applied generally to such
human condition, the result would be impressive, perhaps
oppressive, and certainly an inefficient body of law.
"
Legislative Framework
The,power to regulate corporate law is vested in the Federal
Leglslature under the Malaysian Federal Constitution. The
centralising of this legislative power in Parliament have
the consequence that corporate law in Malaysia is uniform
~hrough?ut the Federation thereby obviating the problems
aced In other jurisdictions which are also federal in
nature e.g. Australia where an attempt to have a uniform
~orpora~e code was in part struck down as ultra vires the
ustrallan Federal Constitution.
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1:.2 Sources of Malaysian Corporate Law
Corporate law in Malaysia is primarily governed by the
provisions of the Companies Act 1965 (No.125) which was
based on the U.K. Companies Act 1948 and the Australian
Uniform Companies Act 1961. Two major subsidiary legislation
(in area of corporate governance) has been passed under the
Companies Act that is:
Companies Regulation 1966
Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers, 1987
These are supplemented by the following legislation and also
regulatory directives:-
The Securities Industries Act
The Securities Commission Act
The Guidelines on the Regulation of Acquisition
of Assets, Mergers and Takeovers (commonly referred toas
the FIC Guidelines).
i.O
The legislative provision co-exists with rules of common law
and equity emanating from judicial decisions from our own
Malaysian Courts and also Singapore, Australia, Canada, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom.
The main bodies which are involved in the regulatory
framework may be set out in diagrammatic form:(see Appendix)
Regulating Corporate Governance
Hist~rically, promoters of a corporation petitioned in the
Eng~lSh Parliament to obtain incorporation on an individual
~a~ls. The terms of incorporation were negotiated and
~olntly settled by the promoters and Parliament. Promoters
7n avoiding rigidities and formalities associated with
lncorporation formed "deed of settlement" and
"unincorporated joint stock companies". By the 19th Century
promoters of a corporation had considerable freedom drawing
up their constitution subject to them meeting minimal
s~a~utory requirements. The Malaysian Companies Act 1965
Sl.lnJ..larlyimpose minimum requirements on the way in
corporations are incorporated in Malaysia.
The Corporation's constitution must provide for a
"m~morandurnof association" and "articles of association"
\olhichad their precursor in the "deed of settlement".
The memorandum contains basic details setting out the name
of the corporation, the promoters, the amount of share
1 • 1
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capital, a statement of objects etc.
Section 33 of the Companies Act provides:-
" Subject to the Act the memorandum and articles shall
when registered bind the company and the members thereof
to the same extent as if they respectively had been
signed and sealed by each member and contained covenants
on the part of each member to observe the provisions of
the memorandum and of the articles. II
This means the memorandum and articles are a statutory legal
contract under which the parties to the contract (the
company and the members) are bound by legally enforceable
contractual duties to comply with the provisions of the
corporate constitution. Certain features of this contract lS
~orth noting. From corporate governance viewpoint, ~t is
lmportant to note that section 33 does not provlde a
contract between shareholders and the management.
Furthermore, according to section 31(1} it is provided
that ... "Subject to the Act and to any condition in its
memorandum, a company may by special resolution alter or add
to its articles". This power of alteration by special
resolution can disturb the pattern of rights and duties to
the prejudice of a member's rights. As Professor Fordobserved:
"
3
The fact that an alteration, other than one in fraud of
minority, can disturb existing rights a.s a sign that
articles are not exactly the same as contractual
provisions but have some of the characteristics of
legislation. Each person, by joining, subjects himself
or herself to the power of a proportion of the total
membership to alter the terms of their relationship to
each other and each one's relationship to the corporateentity. II
(Principles of Company Law 5th Edition p.57)
In practice there has been a variety of devices which seek
to entrench certain rights and duties. Shareholders
agreement, voting arrangement can be entered into providing
~or. various procedual and substantive arrangements which
aellneates the lines of power and entitlements. Insertion of
these provisions in the memorandum may also have an
entrenchment consequence. The common form of Articles of
AssOCiation e.g. Table A (which is entitled Regulations for
mana~ement of a company limited by shares) provides for wideranglng powers e.g.:-
The business of the company shall be managed by the
directors and may exercise all such powers of the
company as are not, by the Act or by these regulations
5
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required to be exercised by the company in general
meeting (Article 73).
.4
The directors may exercise all other powers of the
company to borrow money and to mortga~e or charge its
undertaking, property and uncalle,d,capltal an~ to
issue debentures and other secu.ri.t.Les whether out ri.qht;
or as security for any debt, liability, or obligation of
the company or any third party (Article 74).
Subject to any overarching statutory provision it is
Possible to draw a constitution to provide for greater
powers to shareholders. For example, there is nothing to
prevent insertion of articles that provide for directors
being subject to a more objective standard of care and
diligence than those set out by the common law. Additionally
directors can be made subject to specific contractual
arrangements with the body of shareholders.
• 5 Provisions in the corporate constitution may also affect a
variety of non-shareholders such as employees, creditors f
suppliers and these are normally referred to as
"stakeholders". Again, such stakeholders may contract with
the corporation and in a perfect market model be able to
adjust their contractual terms to take into account any
risks suffered from non-standard terms in the corporateconstitution .
• 6 Regulating the initial Constitution.
There is a strict regulatory regime at the pre-incorporation
stage. The main rationale for this is based on imperfect
ba7gaining between promoters and the initial subcribers. If
t~ls is a perfect information world the governance structure
w1.ll reflect a consensus as to the terms that maximise
wealth. For public companies, the price of the initial
shares will reflect market perception of the efficacy of th~
terms. Promoters have the motivation to maximise share
prices by supplying the terms that the market believe will
maximise shareholders' wealth. Government intervention in
P7om~tion of corporation by strict legislative provisions or
lls~lng criteria for public listing is justified by the
bellef that information supplied may not be congruent withthe facts .
• 7 • The Malaysian regulatory regime in this area is based on a
paternalistic attitude towards ignorant investors who are
assumed ,to be susceptible towards being cheated and that
share prlces may not adequately reflect fair terms.
The basic types of provisions are:-
The
and requirement for prospectus fcontrol of advertisements itsand
standard contents
strict civil and
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1criminal liabilities for mis-statements (see sections
37-47, 5th Schedule).
Compliance with Detailed requirements for listing of
securities set out in the KLSE Listing Requirements (the
Yellow Book).
Compliance with Guidelines For the New Issues of
Securities and the Valuation of Public Companies.
The rationale for the strict regulatory regime is based
principally on assumption of (i) information inefficiency
(ii) possible ethical misconduct of promoters/controllers
(iii) ignorant investors (iv) promotion of a sound and
healthy capital market.
o Regulating Change to the Corporate Constitution.
The Act permits a company by way of special resolution to
alter its memorandum and its articles (section 28, section
31). It now appears that this statutory power has overriding
effp.ct against inconsistent shareholders arrangements so
that a shareholder having not less than 75% can always alter
the articles and cannot be enjoined by the Court from so
asserting this statutory right. This however does not mean
~hat the party who effects such amendments does not breach
~ts contractual obligations so that it can be subject to a
claim in damages.
The Courts have also further fashioned rules governing the
exercise of discretionary powers under the rubric of "fraud
on power" so that it can strike down an exercise of power
(a~beit expressly provided) upon which does not meet the
cri,teria of fair dealing. In Howard Smith Ltd v. Aropol
Petroleum, the Privy Counsel struck down an exercise of
power to issue shares which although "not motivated by any
purpose of personal gain or advantage, or by any desire to
retain their position on the board" on grounds that "it must
be unconstitutional for directors to use their fiduciary
powers over the shares in the company purely for the purpose
of, d~stroying an existing majority, or creating a new
~aJorlty which did not previously exist. To do so is to
~n~erf7re with the element of the company's constitution
whlch lS separate from and set against their powers. "
Corporate Governance in Practice.0
.1 ~he corporation being a separate entity upon its
~ncorporation (section 16(5) of the Act) have the
c~nsequence that shareholders cannot in law control the
~~recto:rs directly but instead operate indirectly through
o maj oj- organs i.e. the shareholder's meeting and theboard of directors.
7
The relative power of each organ
legislation, the corporate constitutions
corporation the listing rules of the KLSE.
2 The Articles invariably delegate to directors all powers of
~anagement (see para 5.3 above) and the effect o~ Article 73
~s that "directors and no one else, are respons~ble for the
management of the company except in the matters specifically
allotted to the company in general meeting" (Alexand~r Ward
& Co Ltd v. Samyanq Navigation Co Ltd (1975) 1 WLR 673).
Eistorically the Board was regarded merely as a delegate
and agent of shareholder's general meeting. By the 20th
Century judicial decisions however established that the
board is not only an agent but one of the primary organs of
the corporation (See Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter
Svndicate Co Ltd v. Cunninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34; Quin &
F..xtensLtd v. Salmon [1909] AC 442). In practicable terms
the directors, once in office may make management decisions
~gainst the wishes of the majority of the shareholders, and
~ndeed the majority cannot corrtrol the exercise of
management powers while the directors remain in office.
~ltimate power of control by shareholders is retained only
~n two instances:
would depend on
and for a listed
3
(i) the power to remove the directors; but this power is a
drastic one and if wielded may prove to be too late to
unravel a transaction (see however section 20 where a
member may take proceedings to prevent an ultra vires
transaction);
(ii) the power to alter the corporate constitution.
In comparison to the range of management powers vested an
the board of directors (by legislation and by the Courts)
there are only limited matters which are commonly reserved
to the general meeting.
altering the memorandum and articles
altering the authorised share capital
consolidating or subdividing the shares
altering rights to shares
altering company's status
residual power to act when the board is unable to
In Malaysia there has been legislative measures to increase
matters which require the general meeting's approval:
the approval for disposal by directors of company's
undertaking or property (sectioin 132C)
the approval for issue of shares by directors (section132D)
substantial property transaction involving connected
8
persons (section 132E read with section 132F and section
122A).
There has also been promulgated the notorious section 132G
(which prohibited certain transactions involving
shareholders and directors) which brought in its wake
widespread repercussions in the corporate community leading
to its amendment introduced as subsection (6) to section132G.
From one perspective the plethora of statutory provisions
are designed to strengthen corporate governance by
empowering shareholders with negative veto rights against
transactions which corne within their purview. It may be
going against the grain of opinion to question this trend;
however, in some instances the statutory provisions appear
to go too far so as to increase the costs of transactions
and to curb entrepreneurial flair and efficiency.
.5 For example:
Section 132C has given rise to uncertainty as to the
scope of meaning of "undertaking" "property" and
"substantial value" leading to doubts as to whether in
anyone transaction approval of general meeting is
needful. Furthermore, it is arguable that only
acquisition/disposal which materially and adversely
affects the performance or financial position of the
company would require the approval of the general
meeting. It can be debated in anyone case whether the
transaction is adverse to the company performance or
financial position.
Section 132E is also ambiguous as to whether it
precludes the board from executing a conditional
agreement given the wide language of the provision. This
has given rise to various devices e.g. execute a
Memorandum of Understanding, Letter of Intent or
initialling a penultimate draft.
Section 132G is riddled with difficulties of
interpretation which (although there is no empirical
study made on it) has a definite effect of thwarting
some deals. The scope to be attributed to "the shares"
"c;.ss~tsof another company" and the notoriously
dl.ffl.cultphrase "first held the ::;hares"has caused much
debate amongst both corporate players, practitioners and
the regulatory authorities. The costs of transaction has
certainly been raised; and whether there are gains to be
made by this provision has yet to be demonstrated from a
macr~-perspective. The section may result in more
par~l.es executing transactions through more layers ofnoml.nees.
9
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5 Shareholders Meetings
Other than the matters introduced by recent amendments,
traditionally shareholders are entitled to vote on a number
of matters such as the election of the board of directors,
alteration to the corporate constitution and major
structural changes in the company's constitution. There is
also the power to ratify certain improper acts by directors.
Apart from the substantive matters above, the procedural
rules upon which the collective will of the company is
determined are also important. It may be said in the formal
sense the shareholders in general meeting is the "sovereign"
power in the corporate entity. However, in reality and
practice shareholders control can face a number of problems.
In close-held corporations (private companies), the
shareholders and directors are essentially the same
individuals or belong to a family grouping so that there is
~o hindrance to shareholder's exercising their voting rights
~n control of management.
In a larger corporation the board
the meeting, sets the agenda
machinery. The Companies Act
procedural rules:-
of directors usually calls
and controls the proxy
sets out only minimum
All companies are required to hold an annual general
meeting (Section 143)
At the AGM a profit and loss account, balance sheet,
auditors and directors reports must be presented.
The AGM may appoint and remove directors and deal with
any matter permitted by the constitution.
In respect to convening of the Extraordinary GeneralMeeting:
by the directors upon the requisition of members holding
(at the date of the deposit of the requisition) not less
than one-tenth of the paid-up capital of the company; or
by two or more members holding not less than one-tenthof the issued share capital.
7 In certain public
share ownership
believed to be aapt:
companies owing to the dispersed nature of
the nature of shareholder controls is
myth. JK Galbraith's oft-quoted words are
" With even greater unction although with less
plausibility, corporate ceremony seek also to give the
10
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shareholders an impression of power. When stockbrokers
are (or were) in control of a company, stockho~de:s '
meetings are an occasion of scant ceremony. The maJor~ty
is voted in and the minority is voted out, with such
concession as may seem strategic, and all understand the
process involved. As stockholders cease to have
influence, however, efforts are made to disguise this
nullity. Their convenience is considered in selecting
the place of meeting. They are presented with handsome
printed reports, the preparation of which is now a
specialised business. During the proceedings, as in the
report, there are repetitive references to your
company. Officers listen, with every evidence of
attention, to highly irrelevant suggestions of wholly
uninformed participants and assure others that these
will be considered with the greatest care. Votes of
thanks from women stockholders in print dresses owning
ten shares "for the excellent skill with which you run
our company are received by the management with well-
simulated gratitude. All present show stern disapproval
of critics and especially those who use the occasion to
attack the social, political or military activities of
the firm. No important stockholders are present. No
decisions are taken. The annual meeting of the large
[American] corporation is perhaps, one most elaborate
exercise in popular illusion. "
(The New Industrial State (1971) p.72-85)
Although slightly caricatured in ito description Galbraith's
words resonates in large public companies in Malaysia. We
may add that the meeting may often end with Malaysian buffet
tea and a gift of the company's products to the devoted
shareholder who attended.
Recent studies have confirmed that the results of a study in
the 70's [Lim Mah Hui, Ownership and Control of the one
huz:dred largest corporations in Malaysia (1981) (Oxford)]
wh~ch revealed that share ownership has been highly
concentrated in the hands of a few institutions is accurate
and that there is in fact a growth of such concentration inthe 90's.
Lim Mah ~ui's study which was based on a survey of 62 large
corporat~ons in the years 1974-76 is significant in pointing
out that the Berle Means thesis of management control rather
than ownership,control cannot be applied to Malaysia without
st:ong correct~ve and empirical analysis. Dr Mansur Md Isapo~nts out that:
" Over the years, it seems that
concentration has increased This is
findings of a KLSE Survey ..:.. which
the ownership
evident from the
shows about 5% of
11
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the shareholders in Malaysia as at the end of 1987
were institutions owning above 80% of the shares. The
remaining 95% wer~ individuals, holding about 20% of the
shares. " (from Investors Digest, KLSE August 1993).
The implication from the above findings are many. For most
investors in public companies the easiest route to expre~s
dissatisfaction with management is by divestment ,of the:-r
holdings. The individual shareholder is a hapless flgure (In
Denning MR I swords "a little David against the Goliath";
see Wallesteiner v Moir (No.2) [1975] QB 373 and it would be
impossible for him to challenge a united majority if the
cost of doing so outweighs the simple costs of exiting thecompany.
LO The cost of seeking remedia~ action against mismanagement or
even positive misconduct lS high and even institutional
shareholders who hold minority equity may find it easier to
cut loss through sale rather than regain loss by court
action. The example of an English case vividly illustrates
this point. In the Prudential Assurance Co Ltd vs Newman
Industries Ltd & Drs (1980) 2 All ER 841;; (1982) 1 All ER
345 litigation, institutional shareholders seeking a variety
o~ remedies against what they contend were breaches of
flduciary duty incurred substantial amounts in costs which
finally resulted in a rebuff by the Courts. The question
nevertheless worth posing is whether considering their power
and sophistication, institutional investors owe an
obligation to their fellow shareholders to oversee corporate
managers and to effect changes when necessary. The relative
passivity of institutional shareholders and its I pro-
management stance are often reflective of the convention of
the ~orporate/financial community, a desire to be able to
obtaln free flow of information and also to obtain other
bUsinesses in their non-investor capacities. There has been
~owever, in the u. S. a healthy tendency for institutional
lnvestors to exercise their independent judgment on the
corporate governance issue; a trend which so long as
cO~flicts of issue are addressed, seems the only alteration
whlch at least gives rise to some hope of providing a check
to the dominance of ownership dominated management.
11 Proxy Contests
Challenges to directors can be by way of Court action or by
way of proxy contests. Shareholders do not have to attend in
person to vote at meetings. Proxy contests however suffer
from a number of defects, especially imperfect information.
Small shareholders are often woefully ignorant of the merits
or ~e~erits of the issues or candidates. The cost of
~~talnlng information about issues or about candidates are
19her than the anticipated gains (if any). For larger
12
shareholders to engage in proxy contests the potential
(private) gains in terms of increased value of their
shareholding must be greater than the transaction costs
involved in obtaining proxies. Experience confirms that
directors have advantages in a proxy fight as the proxy
machinery favours the incumbent e.g. the proxy forms are
sent out with notice of shareholders meeting. In two of the
proxy contests of which the paper writer was involved (The
Petaling Tin's contest and the Hong Leong's bid for Ban Hin
Lee Bank Berhad) the incumbent board of directors emerged
victorious after verbal skirmishes between lawyers acting
for proxies for the contesting factions (The Petaling Tin
contest and the Hong Leong's bid for Ban Hin Lee Bank
Berhad).
Without clear
could even
shareholders.
statutory intervention, the proxy machinery
be more unfairly weighted against the
o Regulating the Directors
The efficacy of governance mechanism depends on whether
shareholders can actually monitor directors. In a perfect
world any breaches of duties are instantly detected and
enforcement of penalties vis-a-vis shareholder's meetings,
regulatory authorities and the courts are meted out
forthwith. But this is not "a zero transaction cost world"
and therefore care must be exercised In setting the
standards of behaviour so as not to blunt the
competitiveness of the Corporation (cf. Michael E. Porter's
"Capital Disadvantage: America's Failing Capital Investment
System" Harvard Business Review September-October 1992
p.65). The Companies Act regulate directors by:
· Prohibiting certain persons from managing (Section 130)
· Disqualifying person from being a director if he has been
a company who has gone into insolvency (Section 130A)
· Providing for disclosure of interests, whether directly or
or indirectly in a contract or proposed contract or holds
any ~ffice or possesses any property which might be in
confllct with his duties as director. (Section 131).
And in respect of a director's basic duty expressly providesthat -
" A director shall at all times act honestly and use
reasonable diligence in the discharge of the duties of hisoffice" (Section 132).
T~e statutory provisions are based on the consideration that
dlrectors are fiduciaries which is well-described by Cardozo
CJ in Meinhard v Salmon (1928) 249 NY 458, 16E NE.
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" Many forms of conduct permissible in a workday would be
for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those
bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something
stricter than the moral of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behaviour. "
The two principal components of duties are -
(a) to exercise good faith in the discharge of duty and
exercise of power;
(b) to exercise reasonable standard of care, diligence andskill.
N.P. The statement of principles are well known enough
and statutory provision in the Companies Act 1965
appropriates these principles by:
Prohibition of dealing by officer in securities
(Section 132A)
Prohibition of abuse of information, more commonly
referred to as "insider trading" (Section 132B; see
also Section 89 of Securities Industry Act) and the
Section 132C, 132D, 132E, 132F and 132G already
referred to above (see para 7.5 above).
The litany of provisions is quite austere and coupled with
b<;'thsevere stipulations of penalties and potential civil
l~abilities it would seem to deter all but the stout
he~rted to accept an office of directorship. Yet many may
st~ll accept directorship without much aforethought for the
prestige it bears and also the perceived compensation.
One cynical commentator observed _
" In England, where they have a "profession" known as
"company director:, the boardroom life is popularly regarded
as a c~shy sinecure. Said Lord Boothby, a life peer, in a
reflect~ve moment: "If you have five directorships it is
heave~, l~ke having a permanent hot bath .... No effort of
any k~nd ~s called for. You go to a meeting once a month in
~ car sUpplied by the company, you look grave and sage, on
,wo occas~ons say "I agree", say "I don't think so once, and
~~ all qoes well yet get 500 pounds just a year. " (from
amberla~n, Why It's harder and harder to get a goodBoard, Fortune Nov 1962 p.109).
~~ would be unfair to generalise the characteristics of
L~rectors but one cannot but feel that there are a hosts oford Boothbys' 'l" ,, even ~n Ma ays~a; part~cularly those serv~ng
as pure nominees who do not discharge their non-executive
14
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directorship with any particular rigour.
In the American Law Institute
Governance is found an admirable
above) concerning the functions
senior executives and directors.
Principles
statement
and powers
of Corporate
(see Para 3.4
of principal
Section 3.02(a) provides:-
"Except as otherwise provided by statute:-
(a) The board of directors of a publicly held corporation
should perform the following functions:-
(1) Select, regularly evaluate, fix the compensation
of, and, where appropriate, replace the principal
senior executive.
(2) Oversee the conduct of the corporation's business
to evaluate whether the business is properly
managed.
(3) Review and, where appropriate, approve the
corporation's financial objectives and major
corporate plans and actions.
(4) Review and, where appropriate, approve major
changes in, and determination of other major
questions of choice respecting the appropriate
aUditing and accounting principles and practices
to be used in the preparation of the
corporation's financial statements.
(5) Perform such other functions as prescribed by
law, or assigned to the board such a standard of
the corporation.
This is an admirable statement of directorial's functions
and powers but given following realities:-
Constraints of Time: (boards seldom meet more than
once a month (at most) and often only bi-monthly.
Cons~raints of Information: opportunity to evaluate and
conslder data to make meaningful decisions is severelyrestrictive.
Constr~ints of composition, selection and tenure (see
M.A. Elsenberg (1976) The Structure of the Corporation,
Chapter 11) - it is to be doubted in actual practice
whether without a rigorous re-examination and reform of
the Board that the goals as exemplified in the re-statement can ever be achieved.
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Enforcing
Practice. Good Directors Liability in Principle and
The remedies available to check directors' malfeasance are
formally impressive. If a corporation is not contro~led by
a concentrated shareholding it is theoretically poss~ble to
resolve a dispute by requisitioning an extraordina~y ge~eral
meeting. A dissatisfied shareholder in a pubLi.c l~s~ed
c<;>rporationordinarily withdraws his inve~tment by sel~~ng
h~s shares. If take-over bidders are act~ve and are g~ven
leeway then indolent directors will have to be watchful.
Clearly as Professor Ford points out, "If.••. market is
efficient there would be less need for remedies in theCourts".
The four main causes of legal action "available to" a memberare:-
(i) member's personal action whether based on express
shareholder's contract in the form of incorporated
joint venture forms or where a company is listed on a
stock exchange, on the basis of an implied term in the
contract between the shareholder and the company that
the company will comply with the listing rules of the
Stock Exchange (see Zytan Nominees Pte Ltd v Laverton
Gold NL (1988) 14 ACLR 524.
(ii) Members' Derivative actions, being an action brought by
a member or members basing a cause of action vested in
the company alone rather than a cause of action based
on plaintiff-shareholder personally.
(iii)Member's application for an order of winding-up
(Section 218).
(iv) Member's statutory remedy for oppressive or
conduct of company's affairs (Section 218 (f)Section 181)
~he issue of enforcement of shareholder's rights arises only
~n the context of the minority shareholders; the majority
share~olders can call a general meeting to dismiss directors
but w~th concentration of share-ownership many corporations
~ave majority shareholders who are also directors. The
~nfamous common law authority of Foss v Harbottle laid down
two major principles viz the non-interference of courts of
acts of directors which are capable of being ratified in
gen7ra~ meeting and that the corporation is the proper
pla~nt~ff for wrongs done to the corporation. The right to
s~e for wrongs done by directors are generally vested in
d~rectors as ~he power to manage is vested in directors (
e.g. ~egulat~on 73 of Table A) has been jUdicially
bdeterm~nedto mean the right to litigate also resides in theoard.
unfair
(i) and
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The Foss v Harbottle rule is definitely inhibitive of
shareholders' ability to utilise legal remedies in the
effecting of good governance on directors. The recognised
exceptions are, if acts of directors are found to be:-
* ultre vires, illegal or criminal
* fraud on minority
* invasion of personal right
In practice the legal costs of funding a minority action (cf
see Wallersteiner V.Moir (No.2) (1975) 1 All ER 849,
Sherborne Park Residents Co. Ltd (1986) 2 BCC 99, 528 and
the complexity of both substantive and procedural
requirements have proved to be almost insurmountable for the
minority. In Smith & Ors v Croft & Ors (No.2) (1987) 3 BCC
207, (No.3) (1987) 3 BCC 218 Knox J. had to decide on
v~rious significant legal and procedural issues as to
m~nority action where three minority shareholders in a
Company brought an action claiming that various payments out
of the company was improper and therefore ought to be
recouped for the company's benefit. The Court held that
there must first be (a) a prima facie case made out that the
Company is entitled to the relief (b) the action fell within
an exception of the Foss v Harbottle rule. Knox J. further
held that an appropriate independent organ should determine
whether the action should continue and in answer to that
question it would be proper to have regard to the views of
the majority of independent shareholders Le. those whose
votes would be cast that secure benefit to the company
rather than to support any sectorial interests. He further
held that whilst a minority shareholder was permitted to
assert a company's right of substantive recovery as a
r7sult of procedure the minority could not have any larger
r~ght to relief from the company itself and could be
prevented from suing if the will of the company was so
expressed through an appropriate independent organ. In the
c~se the majority was entitled to abandon the company's
r~ght of action in the company's interest and the minorityshareholder's action was struck off.
Oppression of the minority: The avenue more often relied
u~on ,would be the statutory remedy of the oppresion of
m~nor~ty and the winding up on the "just and equitable"ground.
~~ ~he,Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd (1978) 2 MLJ 227 the
fa~nt~~f Counsel pointed out that the Malaysian provision
o Sect~on 181 is wider than that of the English equivalent
~nd,t~erefore local courts are not bound to follow English
s:~~~~on~8 al,though~hey would be persuasive in authority.
h ~on 1 ~s super~or to common law remedies in that it isun ampered by d " ,unlimited di proca ural d~ff~cult~es and the court has
~scret~on to order any form of relief. Lord
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Wilberforce in the Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd said
that for the remedy to apply:
"..... there must be a visible departure from the standards
of fair dealing and a violation of the conditions of fair
play which a shareholder is entitled to expect... disregard
involves something more than a failure to take account of
the minority's interest: there must be awareness of that
interest in an evident decision to override it or brush it
aside or act it the proper company procedure .••
what is attacked by the [ remedy ] is not particular a7tsbut the manner in which the affairs of the company are be~ng
conducted or the power of the directors exercised."
To be successful in a minority oppression action the
shareholder must have sufferred harm in his capacity as a
shareholder. Relief is not available for a member of the
company's creditor or shareholder of a creditor (see
Verghese Mathai v Telok Plantations Sdn Bhd (1988) 1 MSC LC
90, 122) Acquiesence in conduct complained of is also a bar
to relief: Rei Senson Auto Supplies Sdn Bhd (1988) 1 MSCLC2.0,067.
Instances in Malaysia and Singapore where mismanagement washeld to be oppressive are:
Neglect and indifference shown by directors towards the
assets of the company where the assets were allowed to
deteriorate to such an extent that it was almost forfeited
b~ the Government (see Ng Chee Keong v Ng Teong Kiat
Hlghlands Plantations Ltd (1980) 1 MLJ 45.
A director paying himself huge director's fees and
makes loans unconnected with company's business so that he
Was held to have disregarded the shareholder's interests
(see the Coliseum Stand Car Services Ltd (1972).1 MLJ. 45.
Where benefits which majority shareholders obtained
we:e out of proportion to benefit to minority shareholders,
eVldence of non-payment of dividends and refusal to allow
proportionate representations on the board (see Re. Gee Hoe
Chan Trading Co. Ltd. (1991) 1 MSCLC 95, S.76
However, where there were merely disagreements on
whet~er certain corporate decisions ought to have been made
a~belt ~anage~ent had taken such decisions honestly and in
gbOd f ai,th, d~sgruntled shareholders were not entitled to
o tain relief (see In result of Tri-Circle Investment Pte&tg (1993) 3 in MSCLC 95, 922.
Remedy of Just & Equitable Winding Up
~~is ~e.medy provided for under S.218(1)(i) gives a wide
lScre 10n to the Court and may be eXercisable in favour of
18
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petitioner - shareholder where :
* the sUbstratum of the company is destroyed.
* when the company is fraudulent from its' time of
incorporation.
* when the company is no longer profitable.
* when there is a deadlock.
* where the company is a quasi-partnership and the members
are unable to cooperate.
* where there is fraud, misconduct or oppression in
management.
Mere differences between directors
justify winding up under this rubric
Products (M) Sdn Bhd (1988) 1 MSCLC
Hian v Ng Kee Wai & Ors (1950 - 1985)
does not suffice to
(see Rei Xing Ji Food
90, 100; also Ng Eng
MSCLC 7.
However the ouster of one director without due cause and
interest of the company from being appointed director and
chairman was held in the circumstance to justify
intervention of the Court : Tay Bok Choon v Tahansen Sdn Bhd
11989) 1 MSCLC 90, 063. The threat of winding up by an
aggrieved shareholder, if backed by justifiable factual
circumstances, constitutes a singularly potent remedy to
bring to heel overweening behaviour of dominant
shareholders. In such instances many cases never reach the
Court and may be settled by means of mediation or
arbitration where the cost of losing the case (leading to
liquidation of corporation) outweighs the cost ofsettlement.
o Who should regulate corporate governance and directorliability?
We have seen that shareholder control through common law and
statutory remedies are not entirely adequate as a result of
the viscissitudes of litigation. The Courts too face
problems setting standards for directors. Judges who are
not entirely conversant with the factual matrix within
which corporate activities are implemented may either set
~nrealistically high standards or alternatively may abdicate
~n ~valuating and adjudicating a dispute. The traditional
bc;ts~s,of the Court's determination is by analogy with a
f~duc~ary which essentially is on a moral basis. Whilst
such a ba,sisis not entirely inappropriate as a reflection
of the w~der community's expectation of fair dealing and
proper behaviour of directors statutory intervention appearsto be g " , ,a~n~ng ~n ~mpetus based on an unexamined assumption
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of the efficacy of law as a mode of social control.
The other
governmental
Commission).
major development is
regulatory agencies
the
(e. g.
setting up of
The Securities
One commentator cautioned (citing various studies) asfollows:-
"Classical regulatory theory argues that policy makers are
motivated by public interest concerns and contends that they
should be concerned with the public good. Disputing ~he
public interest theory is the "economy" theory of regulat~on
that argue government regulation reflects the influence of
special interest groups. As well, regulators, it is
argued have self-interested goals (job retention, power et
cetera). Thus people both determining regulations and laws
and those administering them behave selfishly to further
their own ends". (from Dr R. Ian McEwin, Publi~ ,vs
Shareholder Control of Directors, the Company & Secur~t~es
Law Journal Vol. 10 (1992) P.182, 201)
Whilst it may be inappropriate or premature to apply the
~bove critique to Malaysian regulators its' cautionary note
~s nonetheless of value. It is not an easy task to steer
between the Scylla of unregulated corporate and capital
~ehaviour and the Charybdis of over-regulation leading to
~nefficiency and non-competitiveness for the Malaysiancorporation.
o The Malaysian Corporation as an Institution in Transition.
1 In the 17th Century, the great common law judge, Sir Edward
Coke wrote "Corporations cannot commit treason, nor be
outlawed nor excommunicated for they have no souls". As the
Malaysian corporation moved into the 21st Century, the
question arises whether the management and shareholder of
the Corporation can move the corporation towards its' proper
ends., At the heart of the debate over good governance areqUestlons as to what a corporation is for.
At the commencement of this paper we have included in the
definition of corporate governance reference to other
stakeholders a . e. the employee customers, suppliers andcorom 't' ,, ~nl a.es. In Malaysia, as elsewhere there as tension
arl~~~g as the forces are played out within the tenets of
efflclency, morality and managerial effectiveness (see James
M. Gust~fson and Elmer W Johnson in The U.S. Business
Corpor~t~on (1988) a publication of American Academy of Arts
and SClences, Ballinger Publishing Company).
2 The identifiable tensions are:
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Firstly, within a large corporation the interplay between
structures of authority and accountability and the
conditions to encourage entrepreneurship and adaptability.
Secondly the long term responsibilities of management and
the more restrictive immediate self-interests.
Thirdly, is the more complex interplay of the often
conflicting interests between shareholders and the work
force, and the community's interest as a result of the ~rive
towards a more caring and socially responsible corporat~on.
Any recommendations towards good corporate governance must
take into consideration the dialectical tensions as statedabove.
) Concluding Observations and a Recommendation.
The corporation
industrial and
governance is not
the growth of a
recommend that :
is one of the great inventions of the
capitalist revolution. Good corporate
an option but is a necessary feature for
healthy corporate society. We therefore
A permanent institute be set up by the Government to
provide a proper forum for consultation, debate and
dialogue in respect of proper corporate governance
including in its agenda not only laws and regulations
but evaluation of managerial models and public policiesrelating to the corporation.
This Institute should have representatives from all
major governmental, regulatory, professional academic
consumer bodies and should be properly furnished toreflect its importance.
Consultants serving in its various committees should
review all laws and regulations in light of Malaysia's
corporate experience and developments overseas to keep
abreast with the environment in which good corporategovernance flourishes.
N~ legislation or regulatory
Wlthout an endeavour to seek
of both its' principlesstakeholders.
directive should be passed
a consensual understanding
and practices by all
The setting up of such an Institute would not be a
panacea for all the issues relating to the corporation
~ut would certainly be in step with the democratic
lmpulse which in the final analysis be the justification
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of the existence of the corporation L, e . the conunon
good.
